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Within broad limits, our legal system leaves individuals free to dis-
pose of their property as they wish, either by giving it away or by
transferring it in exchange for the property of others. The freedom
individuals enjoy in this regard includes the power to make contracts,
legally binding agreements that provide for the exchange of property
on terms fixed by the parties. Among contract scholars, there is nearly
universal agreement that the law of contracts, the tangled mass of legal
rules that regulate the process of private exchange, has three legitimate
functions: first, to specify which agreements are legally binding and
which are not;' second, to define the rights and duties created by en-
forceable but otherwise ambiguous agreements; 2 and finally, to indicate
the consequences of an unexcused breach. 3 Beyond this, however, it has
sometimes been suggested that the law of contracts should also be used
as an instrument of distributive justice and that those responsible for
choosing or designing rules of contract law-courts and legislatures-
should do so with an eye to their distributional effects in a self-conscious
effort to achieve a fair division of wealth among the members of
society.
4
* An earlier version of this Article was presented as part of the Wilson Day Program
at the University of Rochester on October 10, 1979. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman,
Owen Fiss, Arthur Leff, and Jerry Mashaw for their helpful comments on a prior draft.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcTs 2 (1963); cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1972) (" 'Contract' means
the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement ....")
2. See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAw 47 (1971) (one function of contract
law is to save parties inconvenience of drafting very long agreements by providing rules
of interpretation); Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
860, 860 n.2 (1968) (court, having determined a contract exists, cannot refuse to apply it
even in case for which parties did not expressly provide); cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-310, 2-511(1)
(1972) (prescribing certain conditions to be considered part of all contracts "unless other-
wise agreed" by parties).
3. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 227 (M. Howe ed. 1963); Farnsworth, Legal
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1147 (1970). In recent years, a
number of writers have advocated an economic approach to the problem of defining the
appropriate remedies for breach. See, e.g., Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender
of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach,
91 HARV. L. RaV. 960 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: O
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093,
1098 (1973) (housing codes, if properly enforced, can play important role in "war on
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There are, in fact, many rules of contract law that are deliberately
intended to promote a distributional end of some sort. Obvious ex-
amples include: usury laws limiting the interest that can be charged
on loans;5 implied, but nevertheless nondisclaimable, warranties of
quality or habitability;" and minimum wage laws.7 The object of each
of these rules is to shift wealth from one group-lenders, sellers, land-
lords, employers-to another-borrowers, buyers, tenants, workers-pre-
sumably in accordance with some principle of distributive justice, by
altering the terms on which individuals are allowed to contract. Can
legal rules of this sort be defended? More generally, is it ever appro-
priate to use the law of contracts-understood in the broad sense in
which I have been using the term-as an instrument of redistribution,
or should the legal rules that govern the process of private exchange
be fashioned without regard to their impact on the distribution of
wealth in society?
Libertarians, who deny that the state is ever justified in forcibly
redistributing wealth from one individual or group to another, answer
this question in the negative.8 Surprisingly, many liberals, who believe
that at least some compulsory redistribution of wealth is morally ac-
ceptable, even required, give the same answer.9 The libertarian's op-
position to the use of contract law as a mechanism for redistribution
poverty"); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. Rav.
1685, 1778 (1976) (contract law an "ideal context" for judicial task of creating "altruistic
order"); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN.
L. REv. 1015, 1016-37 (1978) (housing-code regulation of rental contracts justifiable as
redistributive measure even if not demonstrably "efficient" in economic sense).
5. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-4 (1979); N.Y. BANKING LAw § 173-1 (McKinney 1971).
6. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (housing lease includes implied warranty of habitability).
7. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1976).
8. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 93-102, 133-61 (1961) (redistribution of
wealth restricts liberty and inappropriately attempts to align compensation with moral
worth); R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149-53, 167-74 (1974) (property rights,
established by principles of acquisition and transfer, should be inviolate); Buchanan,
Political Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox, in MARKETS AND
MORALS 69-84 (G. Dworkin, G. Bennett, & P. Brown eds. 1977) (individual freedom in-
consistent with forced economic equality); Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reap-
Praisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293-94 (1975) (contract law provides individuals with a
"sphere of influence" in which they are not required to justify their activity to the state).
9. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 143-50 (1978); J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 87-88,
274-79 (1971); Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. Rv. 877, 890 n.38 (1976); Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, in
VALUES AND MORALS 47, 54-55 (A. Golman & J. Kim eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Basic
Structure]; C. DeMuth, Regulatory Costs and the "Regulatory Budget" 9 (Dec. 1979) (Dis-
cussion Paper, Faculty Project on Regulation, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University). But cf. Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 133
(S. Hampshire ed. 1978) (preference for redistribution by taxation rather than regulation
not essential to liberalism).
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derives from his general belief that the compulsory transfer of wealth
is theft, regardless of how it is accomplished. By contrast, liberals who
oppose the use of contract law as a redistributive device do so because
they believe that distributional objectives (whose basic legitimacy they
accept) are always better achieved through the tax system than through
the detailed regulation of individual transactions. 1
Thus, despite their fundamentally different views regarding the
moral legitimacy of forced redistribution, liberals and libertarians often
find themselves defending a similar conception of contract law. While
lawyers and philosophers in both camps approvingly describe the role
that contract law plays in reducing the cost of the exchange process
itself and emphasize the importance of protecting those engaged in the
process against threats of physical violence and other unacceptable
forms of coercion,' 2 there also appears to be widespread agreement, on
both sides, that the legal rules regulating voluntary exchanges between
individuals should not be selected or designed with an eye to their
distributional consequences. It is tempting to conclude that this con-
ception of contract law, which I shall call the non-distributive concep-
tion, must be correct if those with such sharply divergent views on the
most basic questions of distributive justice agree on its soundness.
In this Article, I argue that the non-distributive conception of con-
tract law cannot be supported on either liberal or libertarian grounds,
and defend the view that rules of contract law should be used to im-
plement distributional goals whenever alternative ways of doing so
are likely to be more costly or intrusive. The Article is divided into
two parts. In the first part I examine the libertarian theory of con-
tractual exchange and argue, against the standard libertarian view, that
considerations of distributive justice not only ought to be taken into
account in designing rules for exchange, but must be taken into ac-
count if the law of contracts is to have even minimum moral accept-
ability. My aim here is to show that the idea of voluntary agreement-
an idea central to the libertarian theory of justice in exchange-cannot
be understood except as a distributional concept, and to demonstrate
that the notion of individual liberty, taken by itself, offers no guidance
in determining which of the many forms of advantage-taking possible
in exchange relations render an agreement involuntary and therefore
unenforceable on libertarian grounds. Having established this general
point, I propose a simple test, similar in form to Rawls's difference
10. See, e.g., R. NozicK, supra note 8, at 172.
11. See, e.g., Basic Structure, supra note 9, at 55, 65.
12. Compare id. at 54-55 (fraud example) with R. Nozicx, supra note 8, at 150 (same).
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principle, 13 for deciding which kinds of advantage-taking should be
permitted and which should not, and argue that this test is the one
libertarians ought to accept as being most compatible with the moral
premises of libertarianism itself.
In the second part of the Article, I challenge the standard liberal
preference for taxation as a method of redistribution. The choice of
a redistributive method involves moral issues as well as questions of
expediency. In my view, however, a blanket preference for taxation is
not justified by considerations of either sort. There is no reason to
think that taxation is always the most neutral and least intrusive way
of redistributing wealth, nor is there reason to think it is always the
most efficient means of achieving a given distributive goal. Which
method of redistribution has these desirable properties will depend, in
any particular case, on circumstantial factors; neither method is in-
herently superior to the other. And while any redistributive scheme is
bound to involve a conflict between distributive justice and individual
liberty, the existence of this conflict, although it raises serious difficul-
ties for liberal theory in general, does not provide a reason for adopting
a non-distributive conception of contract law.
There are important, but different lessons to be learned from both
the liberal and libertarian opposition to using the law of contracts for
distributive purposes, and I shall attempt to clarify these in the course
of my argument. However, while both views contribute to our under-
standing of the difficulties involved in treating the law of contracts as
a mechanism for redistributing wealth, neither view justifies the claim,
implicit in the writings of liberals and libertarians alike, that there is
something morally wrong with using contract law in this way. 14
I. Distributive Justice and the Libertarian Theory of Exchange
A. Voluntary Exchange
The libertarian theory of contract law is premised upon the belief
that individuals have a moral right to make whatever voluntary agree-
ments they wish for the exchange of their own property, so long as the
rights of third parties are not violated as a result. For a libertarian,
there are only two grounds on which an agreement to exchange prop-
erty may be impeached: first, that it infringes the rights of someone
13. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 293-95; Basic Structure, suPra note 9, at 65.
14. See J. RmwLs, supra note 9, at 60, 83, 302-03 (difference principle states that
inequalities should be "arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged. . . and attached to offices and positions open to all").
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not a party to the agreement itself, and second, that one of the in-
dividuals agreeing to the exchange was coerced into doing so, and thus
did not give his agreement voluntarily. Imagine a judge charged with
responsibility for enforcing contracts between the members of a par-
ticular community. So long as the judge acts in a way consistent with
libertarian principles, he need ask himself only two questions when-
ever a contract dispute arises: Did the party now said to be in breach
voluntarily agree to do what the other party wants him to do? Will
performance of the agreement violate the rights of third parties? If the
answers are "yes" and "no," respectively, the contract must be enforced,
regardless of its consequences for the welfare of the individuals in-
volved. If the judge refuses to enforce a particular contract merely
because it has certain distributional consequences, or if he adopts a
general rule invalidating an entire class of contracts for similar reasons,
his actions are indefensible on libertarian grounds. Taking distribu-
tional effects into account in this way is inconsistent with the libertarian
conception of individual freedom and violates the basic entitlement on
which that conception rests.
The question of when an agreement violates the rights of third
parties-as opposed to merely diminishing their welfare-is a difficult
and interesting one, but I shall say nothing about it here.
15 I want,
instead, to focus on the second libertarian requirement for the enforce-
ment of agreements-the requirement of voluntariness. Putting aside
its effect on third party rights, the only thing about an agreement that
matters, from a libertarian point of view, is the process by which it is
reached. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the libertarian
conception of contractual exchange is backward-looking or historical,
16
concerned with how agreements are made but not with their distribu-
tive consequences. There is, however, an ambiguity in this way of
characterizing the libertarian theory of exchange. Imagine, for example,
a legal system in which there is only one way of creating an enforceable
contract-by pronouncing a sacred oath and then reciting the terms
of the agreement. A judge in such a legal system might be instructed
to base his decisions in disputed cases solely on whether the specified
procedure had been complied with, and to ignore entirely the distribu-
tive consequences of his judgments. Whatever one thinks of its merits,
this is a perfectly intelligible method of adjudication which can be
described by saying that so far as the judge is concerned, it is only the
15. The distinction between actions that violate a person's rights and those that merely
reduce his welfare is developed in R. NozicK, supra note 8, at 57-84.
16. See id. at 153-55.
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process leading up to an agreement, and not its distributive effects, that
matters. However, this method-which might be called pure procedur-
alism-ought not to be confused with libertarianism. It is not enough,
for a libertarian, that the procedure for creating contracts (whatever it
might be) has been complied with; it is necessary, in addition, that
it has been complied with in a particular way, voluntarily rather than
involuntarily. If someone has spoken the sacred oath with a gun at his
head there is no justification, from a libertarian point of view, for
enforcing his agreement even though every formality has been meticu-
lously observed. Libertarians and pure proceduralists share a common
unconcern with the distributive consequences of the private arrange-
ments individuals make for exchanging their property: what distin-
guishes these two positions is that the libertarian cares about something
which the pure proceduralist is in theory free to ignore, namely, the
voluntariness of agreement itself.
More importantly, the distinction between these two views must be
maintained so long as libertarianism purports to be a theory of justice
in exchange. The mere fact that someone has observed a particular
procedure in agreeing to do something does not explain why he should
be required to abide by the terms of his agreement; to explain why he
should, an appeal must be made to something other than the procedure
itself.17 Pure proceduralism is not a moral theory at all, although it may
be part of one. By contrast, libertarianism is, or at least claims to be, a
moral theory meant to vindicate the idea of individual freedom. A
libertarian conception of contract law must therefore take the volun-
tariness of agreements, rather than their procedural correctness, as the
ultimate touchstone of liability and disregard the latter where the two
diverge.
But when is an agreement voluntary? For a libertarian, committed to
the notion that all voluntary agreements must be enforced, the widest
view of voluntariness is almost surely unacceptable. Suppose that I
sign a contract to sell my house for $5,000 after being physically
threatened by the buyer. It is possible to characterize my agreement as
voluntary in one sense: after considering the alternatives, I have con-
cluded that my self-interest is best served by signing and have delib-
erately implemented a perfectly rational decision by doing precisely
that. Described in this general way, my agreement to sell appears in
17. Thus, an advocate of pure proceduralism may attempt to defend his position on
the ground that compliance with his favored procedure is the best evidence of voluntary
consent, at which point his position becomes simply a more complicated version of
libertarianism.
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the same light that it would if, for example, I had not been threatened
but signed the contract because I thought $5,000 a good price for the
house. Under this description, however, my act of signing will be in-
voluntary only if it is not motivated by a decision of any sort at all on
my part. Such would be the case, for example, if the purchaser forcibly
grabbed my hand and guided it over the document himself, or com-
manded me to sign the contract while I was in an hypnotic state.
There is, of course, nothing logically absurd about drawing the line
between voluntary and involuntary agreements at this point, but I
doubt most libertarians would wish to do so. Among other things, de-
fining voluntariness in this way conflicts with deeply entrenched no-
tions of moral responsibility. In assessing the voluntariness of an agree-
ment, it is not enough merely to determine that the agreement was
motivated by a deliberate decision of some sort; we also want to know
something about the circumstances under which it was given. But if this
is true, the problem of drawing a line between agreements that are
voluntary and agreements that are not-a problem the libertarian must
confront if the idea of voluntary exchange is to have any meaning at
all-can be understood as the problem of specifying the conditions that
must be present before we will consider an agreement to have been
voluntarily concluded. Put differently, unless the libertarian is prepared
to accept a very broad concept of voluntariness, which equates volun-
tary agreement with rational choice, he must specify the various cir-
cumstances under which even a deliberately given, rational agreement
will be held to have been coerced.'
8
B. Advantage-Taking
Whenever a promisor complains that his agreement was coerced and
therefore ought not to be enforced, he should be understood as claim-
ing that the agreement was given under circumstances that rendered it
involuntary. In making an argument of this sort, a promisor may point
to many different circumstances or conditions: he may say, for example,
that his agreement was involuntary because he lacked the mental and
emotional 'capacities required to appreciate its consequences;
19 or a
promisor may claim that he was threatened or deceived by the other
party,20 or that his agreement was given at a time he was hard-pressed
18. See generally Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD, ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL (1969).
19. See, e.g., Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 40 Misc. 2d 212 (1963)
(plaintiff claimed to suffer from manic-depressive psychosis).
20. See, e.g., Schupp v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 235 Mich. 268, 209 NAV. 85 (1926)
(plaintiff signed contract after being assured he would not be bound by its terms).
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for cash and therefore had no choice but to accept the terms proposed
by the promisee; 21 or a promisor may assert that his agreement was
involuntary because he, unlike the other party, was ignorant of certain
facts which, if known at the time of contracting, would have led him
to make a different agreement or no agreement at all;2 2 or he may say
that the other party had a monopoly of some scarce resource-the only
water hole or the best cow or the strongest shoulders in town-a monop-
oly which enabled him to dictate terms of sale to the promisor, making
their agreement what is sometimes called a "contract of adhesion. -2 3
In some of these cases, the circumstances allegedly making the prom-
isor's agreement involuntary is an incapacity of the promisor himself-
his insanity, youth, ignorance or impecuniousness. In others, the in-
voluntariness of the promisor's agreement is attributable to an act by
the other party-a fraudulent deception or threat of physical harm.
Finally, in some cases, it is the other party's monopolization of a scarce
resource and the market power he enjoys as a result which (it is claimed)
renders the promisor's agreement involuntary. In each case, however,
the promisor is asserting that his agreement, although deliberately
given, lacked voluntariness because of the circumstances under which
it was made-circumstances that in one way or another restricted his
range of alternatives to a point where the promisor's choice could be
said to be free in name only.24
The problem, of course, is to determine when the circumstances
21. See, e.g., Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N.W. 511 (1881) (plaintiff, unable to
afford to sue for amount due him under contract, accepted note for lesser amount and
gave receipt for full balance due).
22. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887) (sale of cow
rescinded where the animal, assumed by both parties to be barren, later proved otherwise);
Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960) (seller of home under duty to
disclose termite infestation). For a theoretical discussion of the scope of the seller's duty
to disclose, see Kronman, Mistake, Disclosing Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
23. Contracts of adhesion are standardized contracts characteristically used by large
firms in every transartion for products or services of a certain kind. The use of such con-
tracts can have profound implications for ordinary notions of freedom of contract:
The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to
shop around for better terms, either because the author of the contract has a monopoly
(natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual
intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger
party, terms whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all.
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm.
L. REV. 629, 632 (1943). For a more recent discussion of adhesion contracts, see Leff, Un-
conscionability and the Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv. 485, 504-08
(1967).
24. Cf. Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 3,
17 (1976) (idea of consent implies that choice occurs against some background of alterna-
tives).
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under which an agreement is given deprive it of its voluntariness in this
sense. In my view, this problem is equivalent to another-the problem
of determining which of the many forms of advantage-taking possible
in exchange relationships are compatible with the libertarian concep-
tion of individual freedom. The latter way of stating the problem may
appear to raise new and distinct issues but in fact it does not. In each
of the hypothetical cases considered above, the promisee enjoys an
advantage of some sort which he has attempted to exploit for his own
benefit. The advantage may consist in his superior information, in-
tellect, or judgment, in the monopoly he enjoys with regard to a par-
ticular resource, or in his possession of a powerful instrument of vio-
lence or a gift for deception. In each of these cases, the fundamental
question is whether the promisee should be permitted to exploit his
advantage to the detriment of the other party, or whether permitting
him to do so will deprive the other party of the freedom that is neces-
sary, from a libertarian point of view, to make his promise truly volun-
tary and therefore binding.25
The term "advantage-taking" is often used in a pejorative fashion,
to refer to conduct we find morally objectionable or think the law
should disallow. I mean the term to be understood in a broader sense,
however, as including even those methods of gain the law allows and
morality accepts (or perhaps even approves). In this broad sense, there
is advantage-taking in every contractual exchange. Indeed, in mutually
advantageous exchanges, there is advantage-taking by both parties. Sup-
pose I have a cow you want, and you have a horse I want, and we agree
to exchange our animals. The fact that you want my cow gives me an
advantage I can exploit by insisting that you give me your horse in
return. Your ownership of the horse gives you a symmetrical advantage
over me. Each of us exploits the advantage we possess and-in this
transaction at least-are both made better off as a result. This might
seem to make my broad conception of advantage-taking empty or trivial.
There is, however, an important reason for using the term in the un-
conventionally broad way that I do. By using the term to refer to all
types of advantage-taking-those we tolerate as well as those we do not-
attention is focused more sharply on the need to explain why the illicit
methods of gain for which we normally reserve the term are thought to
be objectionable.
In order to give meaningful content to the idea of voluntary ex-
change, a libertarian theory of contract law must provide an explana-
25. Cf. id. at 19 (adequate conceptions of "consent" and "freedom" would not legiti-
mate loss of control over one's life resulting from unequal bargaining power).
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tion of precisely this sort. However, although some principle or rule
is needed as a basis for deciding which forms of advantage-taking should
be allowed and which should not be, it is unclear what this principle
or rule might be. Suppose, for example, that my neighbor threatens to
shoot me unless I agree to buy his house. If there is one thing which
must be treated as a condition for voluntary exchange, it is the absence
of direct physical compulsion of the sort involved in this first case. But
suppose that instead of threatening me with physical harm, the seller
merely lies to me about the house-he tells me, for example, that water
pipes inaccessibly buried beneath the basement are copper when in
fact he knows them to be made of iron, an inferior material. Ought
such advantage-taking be allowed?2 6 While it is possible to justify
advantage-taking of this sort on the grounds that only physical coercion
should be disallowed, there is no good reason for making this distinc-
tion the decisive one. Moreover, even if one fastens on the physical
nature of the advantage-taking act, explicit misrepresentation can be
characterized in a way that gives it a physical character as well, for
example by saying that the misrepresentation is communicated by
soundwaves which stimulate an auditory response in the listener which
in turn provokes a neural change that causes him to sign the contract.
This may be fanciful, but it suggests that with enough imagination
any form of advantage-taking can be characterized as a physical in-
trusion,27 and the question of when such a characterization is appro-
priate cannot be answered by simply repeating that it is the physical
nature of the act which makes it objectionable.
At this point, many will be tempted to acknowledge explicit mis-
representation as an illegitimate form of advantage-taking, but insist
26. This kind of advantage-taking does not differ significantly from deception that
does not involve a spoken lie. Suppose that my neighbor makes no threats and tells no
lies but merely covers over evidence of an existing termite infestation so completely that
even an expert will now be unable to discover their presence in the house. See Dejoseph
v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644 (1958). If I agree to buy the house after having had
it inspected by an exterminator, should I be released from my agreement when the
termites later make themselves known? It is difficult to see what reason there could be
for not disallowing this form of advantage-talking if explicit misrepresentation is for-
bidden, other than the fact that here the deception is accomplished without a spoken lie.
But this reason is hardly a good one since the seller has done things which are, in any
meaningful sense, fully the equivalent of a deliberately uttered falsehood. So either it
was a mistake to disallow one form of advantage-taking, or it is a mistake to permit the
other: they ought to stand or fall together.
27. For an ingenious effort to assimilate verbal influence to physical action, see
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 172-74 (1973). According to
Professor Epstein, defendants whose words frighten someone may thereby commit the
tort of assault. If the frightened person suffers injury attributable to fright, or injures
someone else in an attempt to flee, his reactions are not "volitional" on Professor
Epstein's view, and should therefore be regarded as the physical acts of the defendant.
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that the line be drawn there-limiting the conditions necessary for
voluntary exchange to two (absense of physical coercion and fraud).
Suppose, however, that the seller makes no threats and tells no lies,
but does say things that, although true, are meant to encourage me
to draw a false conclusion about the condition of the house and to
inspect the premises less carefully than I might otherwise. (The seller
tells me, for example, that the house has been inspected by an ex-
terminator from the Acme Termite Company every six months for the
last ten years, which is true, but neglects to inform me that during his
last visit the exterminator discovered a termite infestation which the
seller has failed to cure.) By telling me only certain things about the
house, and not others, the seller intends to throw me off the track and
thereby take advantage of my ignorance and naivet6. The same is true
if he tells me nothing at all, but simply fails to reveal a defect he knows
I am unaware of-a case of pure nondisclosure.28
Should this last form of advantage-taking be allowed? At this point,
undoubtedly, many will be inclined to say I have only myself to blame
for drawing an incorrect inference from the seller's truthful repre-
sentations and for failing to take precautionary measures such as having
the house inspected by an expert. But why is this a good reason for
holding me to my bargain here, but not in the previous cases as well?
I can, for example, protect myself against the risk that I will be forced
to sign a contract at gunpoint by hiring a bodyguard to accompany me
wherever I go; and I can protect myself against the danger of explicit
misrepresentation by requiring the other party to take a lie detector
test or, more simply, by insisting that he warrant the house to be free
of pests or any other possible defect that happens to concern me. Why
isn't my failure to protect myself in these cases a good reason for en-
forcing the agreement I have made?
In attempting to sort out these various forms of advantage-taking, a
number of distinctions suggest themselves-for example, the distinc-
tion between physical and non-physical advantage-taking, or between
those forms of advantage-taking that can be prevented by the victim
and those that cannot. None, however, provides a principled basis for
determining which forms of advantage-taking ought to be allowed.
Each can be interpreted in different ways, yielding different results, and
the distinctions themselves provide no guidance in deciding which of
28. In many jurisdictions, a seller is now required by law to disclose the presence of
termites in a dwelling, despite the buyer's failure to make inquiries. See, e.g., Williams
v. Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, 141 N.V.2d 650 (1966); Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192
S.E.2d 204 (1972); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960).
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the competing interpretations is the right one. An independent prin-
ciple of some sort is required to determine the scope and relevance of
these distinctions, and consequently it is that principle, whatever it
might be, rather than the distinctions themselves that explains why we
ought to allow some forms of advantage-taking but not others.
C. The Principle of Paretianism
While there are many principles that might conceivably perform
this function, the libertarian may be inclined to think that only one
is morally acceptable. This principle, which I shall call the liberty
principle, states that advantage-taking by one party to an agreement
should be allowed unless it infringes the rights or liberty of the other
party. The liberty principle has an appealing directness and simplicity.
It does not, however, provide a satisfactory test for discriminating be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable forms of advantage-taking in the
exchange process, but rather begs the question it is meant to answer.
For the liberty principle to be of any help at all, we must already
know when an individual is entitled to complain that his liberty has
been violated and to know this, we must know what rights he has. For
example, we cannot say whether the liberty principle is violated if one
person takes advantage of another by concealing valuable information
in the course of an exchange, unless we have already decided that it is
part of the first person's liberty that he be allowed to exploit the in-
formation he possesses in this way and not a part of the other person's
liberty that he be free from such exploitation. The liberty principle
does not purport to tell us what rights people actually have but assumes
that we possess such knowledge independently of the principle itself.
How can we acquire the independent knowledge of rights needed to
give the liberty principle meaning? Someone might claim that we can
acquire such knowledge simply by looking to see what rights people
have either by nature or convention. But rights cannot be ascertained
in this way. Every claim concerning rights is necessarily embedded in
a controversial theory: the only way to justify the claim that a person
has a certain right is to argue that he does, and this means deploying a
contestable theory29 that cannot itself be verified or disproven by simply
29. My argument here is that individual liberty is an "essentially contested concept,"
as that term is defined by W.B. Gallie. See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56
PRoC. ARISrOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 167-68 (1956). According to Gallie's formulation, a concept
should be considered "essentially contestable" when it is evaluative as well as descriptive
and has such diverse criteria of applicability that analysis of ordinary usage yields no
single, preferred definition. The question which is the "best" definition is thus open to
argument. The libertarian's failure to provide such an argument for his definition of
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looking to see what is the case. In order to apply the liberty principle,
we must already have a theory of rights. Because it does not itself
supply such a theory, the liberty principle, standing alone, provides no
guidance in deciding which forms of advantage-taking ought to be
allowed.
If a direct appeal to the liberty principle is unhelpful, the libertarian
is confronted with the problem of finding an alternative basis for
distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable forms of advan-
tage-taking in the exchange process. A number of different principles
suggest themselves, but three seem to me especially significant and I
shall limit myself to these.
First, a libertarian might adopt the view that some people are simply
better than others-more intelligent, beautiful, or noble-and argue
that being a better person gives an individual the right to exploit his
inferiors in certain ways.30 A full elaboration of this view, which rests
upon what may be called the doctrine of natural superiority, would
require the following: a specification of the respects in which people
differ as to their worth; a defense of the claim that worthiness is a
legitimate ground for the assignment of rights and duties; and an
account of the types of exploitation that can be justified by an appeal
to the superiority of the exploiting party.
Second, a libertarian might attempt to justify certain forms of ad-
vantage-taking by arguing that they increase the total amount of some
desired good such as happiness. Classical utilitarianism is the most
familiar example of such a view; for convenience, I shall refer to the
view itself as utilitarianism.31
Finally, a libertarian might attempt to distinguish between different
forms of transactional advantage-taking by invoking the interest of the
disadvantaged party himself. In some cases, it is reasonable to think
that a person who has been taken advantage of in a particular way will
be better off in the long run if the kind of advantage-taking in question
is allowed than he would be were it prohibited. Whenever this is true,
a libertarian might argue the advantage-taking should be permitted
and in all other cases forbidden. I shall call this third view paretianism
individual liberty is criticized in Scanlon, supra note 24, at 3. For useful discussions of the
disputable meaning of abstract concepts, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-35
(1977) (distinguishing concepts from "conceptions" offered as elucidations of them); S.
HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 230-31 (1959) (disputes about boundaries necessarily
involve disputes about host of connected notions).
30. See F. NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER §§ 901-902, 926 (Vintage ed. 1968).
31. For an energetic defense and an equally spirited critique of utilitarianism, see J.
SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
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because of its close connection with the idea of Pareto efficiency.32
Each of these three principles provides an intelligible criterion for
discriminating between acceptable and unacceptable forms of advan-
tage-taking in the exchange process. Each leads to different results. All
three rely upon something other than the bare idea of individual liberty
and are therefore immune from the special criticisms to which the
liberty principle is subject. Only the last of these three principles,
however, is consistent with the basic ethical commitments of liber-
tarianism; if a libertarian were required to choose among the three, the
only one that he could choose without abandoning his most funda-
mental moral beliefs would be the third.33
In the first place, libertarianism is a strongly egalitarian theory.
According to the libertarian, all individuals are equal in what, from a
moral perspective, is the most important respect-in their basic right to
freedom from the interference of others. This feature of libertarianism
rules out the doctrine of natural superiority as a basis for discrimi-
nating between acceptable and unacceptable forms of advantage-taking.
The doctrine of natural superiority not only leads to non-egalitarian
results, as may libertarianism itself, but also rests upon a notion of
differential worthiness wholly incompatible with the libertarian con-
ception of individual equality. There is no way of incorporating the
doctrine of natural superiority within the framework of a libertarian
theory of rights.
In addition to being strongly egalitarian, libertarianism is also an
individualistic theory in the sense that it assigns a unique value to the
32. Principles similar to paretianism have been discussed in connection with a range
of legal problems. See, e.g., C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 187-91 (1970) ("risk pool"
concept in tort law); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 77-78 (1979) (implicit in-kind compensation in nuisance law);
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1194-96, 1222-24 (1967) (distribution of
longrun benefits and losses in eminent domain law); Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensa-
tion Criteria, 86 Q.J. EcON. 407, 420-21 (1972) (paretian criterion defined in terms of
longrun probabilities); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication (forthcoming in 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. (1980)) (ex ante compensa-
tion). For a discussion of the ethical implications of the Pareto principle, see Coleman,
Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law
(forthcoming in 68 CALIF. L. REv. (1980)).
33. Libertarians therefore face the following choice: show that the liberty principle
does in fact yield a determinate solution to the problem of specifying which forms of
advantage-taking are legitimate; acknowledge the vacuousness of the liberty principle but
argue that some other principle, different from the three I have considered, is the best
one; or, finally, accept paretianism as the appropriate standard by which to assess the
legitimacy of the various kinds of advantage-taking possible in exchange transactions.
Even from a libertarian point of view, the last alternative seems to me the most attractive
of the three and in what follows I shall assume that this is in fact the choice most liber-
tarians would make.
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autonomy of the individual person. Any principle, such as utilitari-
anism, that purports to evaluate states of affairs solely on the basis of
the total amount of some good they happen to contain is capable of
taking the idea of autonomy into account only indirectly; utilitarianism
can give weight to the independence of individuals only insofar as their
independence contributes to something else which is taken to be good
in itself. 34 Given the peculiar strength of his commitment to individual
autonomy-to the idea that individuals have moral "boundaries" which
must be respected even if more happiness or welfare could be produced
by disregarding them 35-the libertarian must also reject utilitarianism
as a basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable forms
of advantage-taking. This leaves only paretianism, which states that a
particular form of advantage-taking should be allowed if it works to
the longrun benefit of those disadvantaged by it, but not otherwise-
a principle that is neither anti-individualistic, since it does not make




An important ambiguity in the principle of paretianism may seem
to cast doubt on this claim, however. Suppose that Jim sells Fred a
watch and lies to him about its condition. Should Jim be permitted
to exploit Fred by deliberately defrauding him? On the assumption
that paretianism is a strongly individualistic principle, one might con-
clude that it requires us to answer this question by considering the
longrun effect of Jim's deceit on Fred's individual welfare. There are
good reasons, however, for not interpreting the principle in this way.
To begin with, it would probably be impossible for courts to make
such highly individualized assessments, except in rare cases, and in any
34. This is true even of utilitarian theories that treat individual autonomy as an in-
trinsic good to be maximized, perhaps along with other intrinsic goods. If autonomy is
made a maximand in this sense, then any limitations can be placed on a person's freedom
so long as they yield a greater total amount of freedom overall. But this is to deny that
persons have autonomy in the sense in which I am using the term. Respect for the
autonomy of persons means that individuals cannot be restricted in their freedom solely
for the purpose of increasing the overall amount of some desired good, including freedom
itself.
35. Libertarian theorists often express the concept of individual autonomy in terms
of the related notion of personal "boundaries." See R. NozICK, supra note 8, at 57-87;
Epstein, supra note 32, at 50-54. The notion of boundaries suggests that each moral
agent possesses a natural right to be free from violations of his body, and, more
problematically, a similar right to be free from imposition of constraints on choice that
are incompatible with moral personhood. His commitment to the idea of personal
boundaries requires the libertarian to reject any theory, such as utilitarianism, that per-
mits the violation of boundaries whenever the sum of some impersonal good can be ad-
vanced by doing so.
36. The latter point is developed more fully in a later section. See pp. 491-93 infra.
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event, an approach of this sort would create uncertainty and deprive
legal rules of their predictability. Moreover, unlike a court, a legisla-
ture must evaluate the effects of proposed rules on classes of persons
rather than on particular, identifiable individuals. For these reasons,
a strictly individualistic interpretation of paretianism is likely to make
the principle unworkable in all but a few cases.
How should the principle be interpreted, then? Although the matter
is by no means free from difficulty, one reasonable approach is to in-
terpret paretianism as requiring only that the welfare of most people
who are taken advantage of in a particular way be increased by the
kind of advantage-taking in question.37 If one adopts this view, in order
to resolve the dispute between Jim and Fred, it is only necessary to
decide whether most victims of fraud will be better off in the longrun,
all things considered, if conduct such as Jim's is legally tolerated.
This interpretation of the principle of paretianism makes the prin-
ciple easier to apply. At the same time, however, it appears to diminish
the difference between paretianism and utilitarianism by substituting
the overall welfare of a group for the welfare of a particular individual.
But despite this appearance of similarity,38 there are two related re-
spects in which these principles remain distinguishable from one
another. In the first place, paretianism and utilitarianism may lead to
different results where the group of persons harmed by a particular
form of advantage-taking represents a permanently distinct subset of
society as a whole, since in cases of this sort, it is always possible that
total welfare will increase while the welfare of the disadvantaged group
declines. Assume, for example, that most people with low IQs are dis-
advantaged in their transactions with brighter people. Whether this
kind of advantage-taking should be allowed depends entirely, for the
utilitarian, on the total amount of welfare that it yields. If one adopts
the principle of paretianism, on the other hand, advantage-taking by
those with superior intellectual endowments can be justified only if it
increases the longrun welfare of those with low IQs.
This points to a second and more fundamental difference between
37. The practical necessity of evaluating rules by reference to their effects on classes
rather than on particular individuals has been recognized previously. See J. RAwts, supra
note 9, at 98. Rawls keys his difference principle to the welfare of the least advantaged
class rather than the least advantaged person, and argues that a theory intended to pro-
tect individuals can employ general classifications with complete internal consistency
when such classifications afford fuller protection to individuals than any other "prac-
ticable" scheme. See id.
38. For a fuller discussion of the differences between paretianism and utilitarianism
as ethical theories, see Kronman, Wealth Maximization As a Normative Principle (forth-
coming in 9 J. LEGAL STUD. (1980)).
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the two principles. The principle of paretianism ultimately rests on the
notion that one person should be permitted to make himself better off
at another's expense only if it is to the benefit of both that he be
allowed to do so. By contrast, utilitarianism-as I use the term-is
premised on the belief that more welfare is always better than less,
regardless of how it is distributed. For a utilitarian, an increase in the
total quantum of welfare is ethically significant in its own right; from
the standpoint of paretianism, an increase of this sort has no meaning
by itself. To be sure, a utilitarian may be driven to adopt paretianism
as the best available method for measuring increases in total welfare,30
but the principle of paretianism can never have independent ethical
significance for the true utilitarian. Likewise, someone committed to
paretianism may conclude that a simple summing of utilities is the
only practical way of implementing his favored principle, but never-
theless reject the utilitarian notion that greater total welfare is a moral
good in its own right, regardless of how it happens to be distributed
among individuals. Thus, even where utilitarianism and paretianism
converge to the same practical result, they do so for different reasons,
arriving at a common conclusion from fundamentally different starting-
points.
In comparing moral principles, it is important to consider the reasons
they provide for acting in certain ways, as well as the actions they
require and forbid. 40 Utilitarianism and paretianism offer strikingly
different justifications for permitting certain forms of advantage-taking
in the exchange process. Paretianism permits only those forms of ad-
vantage-taking that work to the benefit of all concerned, a requirement
rooted in the conviction that every person has an equal right not to
have his own welfare reduced for the sole purpose of increasing some-
one else's.41 This constraint expresses, in a powerful way, respect for
the integrity of individuals, and distinguishes paretianism from every
ethical theory-including utilitarianism-that treats the maximization
of some impersonal good as an end in itself. Since he is committed to
the idea of individual integrity, the libertarian has good reason to prefer
the principle of paretianism over utilitarianism and to adopt the former
principle as a basis for discriminating between acceptable and unac-
ceptable forms of advantage-taking in exchange transactions.
39. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 32; Posner, supra note 32.
40. See KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF
ETHICS 4-5 (6th ed. T. Abbott trans. 1909).
41. This conviction is an element of Rawls's theory as well. See J. RAWLs, supra note
9, at 3-4, 22-27.
488
Vol. 89: 472, 1980
Contract Law and Distributive Justice
D. Paretianism Applied
I want now to indicate, in a more concrete way, how the principle
of paretianism can be used to give meaningful content to the idea of
voluntary exchange by helping us decide which kinds of advantage-
taking should be permitted and which should not. Let me begin with
a relatively easy case. 42 Suppose that A owns a piece of property that,
unbeknownst to A, contains a rich mineral deposit of some sort. B, a
trained geologist, inspects the property (from the air, let us assume),
discovers the deposit, and without disclosing what he knows, offers to
buy the land from A at a price well below its true value. A agrees, and
then later attempts to rescind the contract on the ground that B's
failure to reveal what he knew about the property amounted to fraud.
The general question here is whether buyers who have deliberately
acquired superior information should be permitted to exploit their
advantage by making contracts without revealing what they know or
believe to be true. Except in special cases, 43 the law does not require
disclosure by well-informed buyers, at least where their information is
the product of a deliberate search. This rule can be defended in the
following way. If B has made a deliberate investment in acquiring the
information that gives him an advantage in his transaction with A,
imposing a duty of disclosure will prevent him from reaping the fruits
of his investment and thereby discourage others from making similar
investments in the future. But this means that a smaller amount of
useful geological information will be produced. As a result, the ef-
ficient allocation of land, the allocation of individual parcels to their
best use, will be impaired. It is plausible to argue that this will hurt
those at an informational disadvantage in particular exchanges more
than they would be helped by imposing a duty of full disclosure in sale
transactions such as the one involved here. For example, although im-
posing a duty of this sort will enable A to back out of a disadvantageous
transaction with B, it will also increase the price A has to pay for oil
and aluminum because the incentive to make the investment necessary
to determine which pieces of land contain these resources in the first
place will have been weakened as a result. Thus, a legal rule permitting
B to buy A's property without disclosing its true worth arguably works
to A's own benefit, since it provides a stimulus for the production of
42. For a fuller discussion of this and similar cases, see Kronman, supra note 22, at
9-18.
43. An example of such a case is a situation in which there is a prior fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties.
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efficiency-enhancing information. This is, in any event, the kind of
argument required by the principle of paretianism.
Although paretianism justifies certain types of advantage-taking,
44
it clearly rules out others. Suppose, for example, that B forces A to sell
his property by threatening A with physical harm. If B's behavior does
not bar enforcement of the contract, A himself may on other occasions
be able to benefit from such a rule by coercing others to make agree-
ments against their will. In the longrun, however, it is unlikely that
A will be better off if physical coercion is permitted in the exchange
process; as long as the means of violence are distributed in a relatively
even fashion, there is no reason to think that A's gains from such a rule
will exceed his losses. More importantly, a rule of this sort would give
people an incentive to shift scarce resources from productive uses-
uses that increase everyone's level of material well-being-to non-
productive ones (the development of more powerful weapons and
better bulletproof vests) that improve no one's position but merely
maintain the status quo. A legal rule permitting physical coercion in
the exchange process would therefore have exactly the opposite effect
of a rule permitting well-informed buyers to exploit deliberately
acquired information.
The same is true of fraud (the deliberate production of misinforma-
tion).45 If B agrees to purchase A's automobile after A has lied to him
about its mechanical condition, enforcing B's agreement despite A's
fraud will hurt B and benefit A. The next time, however, A may be the
victim and B the successful defrauder. Once again, there is no reason
to think that most people will benefit from a rule permitting fraud; in-
deed, this is impossible, since total gains from such a rule will exactly
equal total losses. Moreover, adopting a rule of this sort would give
everyone an incentive to invest in the detection of fraudulent repre-
sentations. Such investments yield information, but only of a non-
productive kind. It is to everyone's advantage that resources be devoted
to other uses; a rule prohibiting fraud in exchange transactions en-
courages precisely that result.
Of course, the principle of paretianism does not always yield so clear
an answer as these cases might suggest. Suppose, for example, that A
is aware of an important defect in his own property-a termite in-
festation, say-and merely fails to inform B of the defect's presence. A
is surely exploiting his superior information at B's expense; in this
44. Arguments similar to the one in text can be made to justify taking advantage of
superior acumen or intelligence. See J. RAWLs, supra note 9, at 100-08.
45. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 80-84 (2d ed. 1977).
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respect, A's conduct is indistinguishable from B's in the situation
described earlier-when B offers to buy A's property without revealing
what he knows about its true value. Moreover, A's information, like
B's, is productive in nature, because it reveals a fact that must be
taken into account if the allocation of scarce resources is to be as
efficient as possible. Unlike B's information, however, A's knowledge
regarding the termites may be the product of casual observations made
while living in the house, rather than the result of a deliberate and
costly search. If so, a rule requiring A to disclose what he knows about
the termites will have no, or only a small, effect on the production
of such information. Moreover, a rule of this sort will reduce B's
own inspection costs-which are likely to be higher than A's, given B's
unfamiliarity with the property.46 Assuming that most people will be
buyers about as often as they are sellers, one may perhaps tentatively
conclude that their gains from a legal rule requiring sellers to disclose
substantial, nonvisible defects will exceed the occasional losses they
suffer as a result.
It does not follow, of course, that most people will be made better
off if sellers of all sorts are required to disclose defects of every kind.
Beyond a certain point, a rule requiring disclosure may have significant
and undesirable incentive effects, and in some cases, the buyer's own
search costs are likely to be so low as to trivialize the benefits he receives
from disclosure. Even in this difficult area, however, the principle of
paretianism provides guidance by indicating the kind of argument that
must be made in order to justify any particular disclosure rule, whether
it be a broad or narrow one.47
E. Paretianism and Equality
The principle of paretianism requires us to evaluate different kinds
of advantage-taking by asking whether they make the disadvantaged
themselves better off in the long run. But what is the baseline against
which we are to measure changes in the welfare of the disadvantaged?
Clearly, the baseline is represented by the situation in which the ad-
vantage-taking in question is legally forbidden: advantage-taking is to
46. See Kronman, supra note 22, at 13-14.
47. Although the application of the principle of paretianism in difficult cases may
require the resolution of factual questions that the professional economist is best equipped
to answer, it would be a mistake to think that the principle states merely an economic
test for assessing different forms of advantage-taking in exchange transactions. It would
be more accurate to say that paretianism provides the morally inspired framework within
which technical economic issues (for example, those regarding the incentive effects of a
proposed disclosure rule) must be debated.
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be allowed only if the disadvantaged are made better off than they
would be were it prohibited. But the baseline situation, conceived in
this way, is a situation of equality. Consequently, if a libertarian adopts
paretianism as the basis for discriminating between acceptable and
unacceptable forms of advantage-taking in the exchange process-and
I have argued that he has good reasons for doing so-he will be en-
dorsing a view that rests upon what, from a libertarian perspective, may
seem to be a surprisingly strong egalitarian premise.
An example will help to clarify what I mean. Suppose that A pos-
sesses certain information but is forbidden to exploit it for his own
benefit. If he wishes to make any use of the information in his transac-
tions with others, A must reveal what he knows; a failure to do so, in
any particular case, will render the other party's agreement unenforce-
able. When it is disclosed, A's information becomes a public asset
which everyone has an equal right to use as he pleases. If A cannot
make an enforceable contract without disclosing what he knows, he
will be unable to exploit his informational advantage except on terms
that benefit others equally. The alternative, of course, is to give A a
property right in his information and permit him to exploit it as he
would any other privately owned asset. The principle of paretianism
states, however, that a property right of this sort should be granted only
if those to whom the information is not disclosed will be even better
off than they would be were the information treated as a public asset
belonging to no one in particular and thus available for the equal use
of all. It is the latter situation that provides the baseline against which
we are to measure changes in the welfare of the disadvantaged.
The egalitarian nature of this baseline situation is illustrated, in a
different way, by the rule forbidding the use of physical force in ex-
change relationships. Suppose that A has greater physical strength than
his neighbors. If we refuse to give A the right to exploit his superior
strength by threatening his neighbors with harm unless they agree to
do what he wishes, we once again place everyone involved (the person
who possesses the advantage as well as those who do not) in a situation
of equality. Here, of course, equality is achieved not by forcing A to
share his advantage with others, but by denying everyone, including A,
a right to make use of the advantage in question, at least in this par-
ticular way.
Paretianism justifies divergence from this situation of equality only
when A's weaker neighbors can be made better off if A is permitted
to enforce agreements coerced by threats of physical force. The fact
that A is not allowed to do so but is given the right to exploit his
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superior strength in other ways-for example, by insisting upon a
higher price for his labor-only shows that the principle yields different
results where different forms of advantage-taking are involved. In every
case, however, the principle forbids us to grant the possessor of an
advantage the exclusive right to exploit it for his own benefit unless
those excluded from its ownership are thereby made better off than
they would be if no one were given a greater right to the advantage
than anyone else. Stating the principle in this way emphasizes its
strongly egalitarian character and underscores its similarity to Rawls's
test4" for assessing the fairness of inequalities in the distribution of
material wealth.
F. Possession and Ownership
Another way of representing the egalitarian character of paretianism
is to imagine that all advantageous assets, including strength, in-
telligence and information, belong to a common pool or fund in which
no one-not even the person who possesses the advantage-has any prior
claim.49 With regard to any advantage in the common pool, three
possibilities exist: 1) the person possessing the advantage may be
granted a right to exploit it for his own benefit; 2) the possessor may
be allowed to exploit the advantage, but only in ways that benefit
others equally; or 3) he may be forbidden to exploit the advantage at
all. Paretianism is then to be viewed as a principle for determining
which of these three alternatives ought to be adopted in any particular
case, and thus for deciding who should be assigned the rights to dif-
ferent kinds of advantages.
Of course, many libertarians reject this way of thinking about the
assignment of rights, claiming that attributes and advantages come into
the world already attached to particular individuals and not as part of
some common pool or fund. 50 Libertarians claim that mere possession
of an advantage gives the possessor a right to exploit his advantage in
any way he wishes, so long as the rights of others are not violated in
the process. On this view, the fact that an individual possesses a par-
ticular advantage is held to give him a prima facie right to exploit it
48. See note 14 supra.
49. This "common fund" notion is employed by Rawls. See J. RAWIS, supra note 9,
at 101-02, 107, 179, 278 (no one deserves greater natural capacity nor merits more favorable
starting place in society). For my views on the reasonableness and utility of treating all
personal assets as if they belonged to a common fund, see Kronman, Talent Pooling
(forthcoming in NoMos).
50. See R. NozicK, supra note 8, at 228-31.
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for his own benefit; his right to do so, however, may be defeated or
overridden by the legitimate claims of others.51
This view implies that possession itself provides a moral reason-
although only a defeasible one-for assigning property rights in par-
ticular advantages to those who possess them. In my judgment, how-
ever, the fact of possession fails to provide even a limited justification
for assigning property rights in one way rather than another. Suppose
that X possesses two advantages that Y lacks-greater physical strength
and superior intelligence. Should we allow X to exploit these advan-
tages in his transactions with Y, in whatever way he wishes? Most
libertarians would answer this question in the negative: X should not
be allowed to exploit his physical strength by threatening Y with harm,
and he should not be permitted to exploit his intelligence by persuad-
ing Y to accept a believable lie, although he may be free to take ad-
vantage of his gifts in other ways. Presumably, the reason a libertarian
will give for disallowing certain forms of advantage-taking on X's part
is that they violate Y's right not to be coerced in these ways. But which
types of coercion violate Y's right to non-interference? However one
answers this question, the fact that X possesses the advantage he wants
to exploit can never be an argument for defining the scope of Y's
right in a certain way; that proposition will always be true and there-
fore cannot make the position of either party stronger (or weaker) than
it would otherwise be. Likewise, it can never be an argument either for
limiting or expanding the scope of Y's right to non-interference that
Y himself possesses an interest that will be affected if others are allowed
to take advantage of him, since this, too, is true in every case. The
mere fact of possession-whether X's or Y's-provides no help whatso-
ever in deciding how Y's right to non-interference should be defined,
or whether X should be assigned an exclusive right to the advantages
he possesses.
Thus, it is a mistake to think that the fact of possession has any moral
significance in itself, even of the limited sort claimed by libertarians,
so far as the assignment of entitlements is concerned. By viewing in-
dividual advantages as if they were part of a common fund or pool, one
eliminates the fact of possession as a relevant consideration and thereby
avoids this mistake. The great attraction of viewing advantages in this
way is that it forces us to clarify the underlying argument that must
always provide the true foundation for protecting one set of possessory
interests rather than another.
51. See R. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title (unpublished paper on file with
Yale Law Journal).
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G. Advantage-taking and Differences in Wealth
At this point, most libertarians would probably respond by claiming
that I have shown the libertarian theory of contract law to be a theory
of distributive justice in only a limited or perhaps even trivial respect.
While conceding that the notion of voluntary exchange cannot be
given meaning without specifying how rights to transactional advan-
tages in the exchange process itself are to be distributed, a libertarian
might argue that this can be done without attaching any importance
whatsoever to the distributional consequences of those exchanges in
which there has been no impermissible advantage-taking. So long as
there has been no advantage-taking of this sort, he might argue, agree-
ments should be enforced regardless of their impact on the distribu-
tion of wealth in society. On this view, contractual limitations of the
sort mentioned at the beginning of the Article-restrictions on interest
rates, minimum wage laws, and nondisclaimable warranties-would be
wholly unjustified if one assumes their purpose is not to insure volun-
tariness in exchange transactions, but to alter the distribution of wealth
that results from the free exchange of property itself. In this way, a
libertarian might concede that a limited theory of distributive justice
is needed to explicate the notion of voluntary exchange, yet still main-
tain that his view is meaningfully different from that of anyone who
believes it appropriate to manipulate the private law of contracts in
order to achieve a more desirable distribution of wealth in society.
This position can be interpreted in one of two different ways. First,
the claim may be that differences in wealth created or maintained by
contractual exchange need not be justified by invoking the same prin-
ciple of distributive justice, whatever it might be, that we appeal to
in justifying various forms of advantage-taking in exchange relation-
ships. On this view, differences in wealth that result from the free ex-
change of property are not to be thought of as requiring any justifica-
tion at all, unlike the assignment of rights to transactional advantages
in the exchange process; while the latter poses a problem of distribu-
tive justice, the former does not. I shall call this interpretation of the
position the strong interpretation.
A second, weaker interpretation is also possible. Someone defending
the position in question can be understood as claiming either that
disparities in wealth which result from the free exchange of property
are justified, on the same basis that certain forms of transactional ad-
vantage-taking are, or that existing disparities in wealth are not justi-
fied but should be corrected in some other way than by manipulating
the rules for private exchange. I call this second interpretation weak
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because it accepts what the first interpretation questions-the claim that
differences in wealth resulting from free exchange stand as much in
need of justification as the exploitation of differential advantages in
the exchange process itself.
In my view, the first of these two interpretations must be rejected
since it rests upon an essentially arbitrary distinction between different
kinds of wealth and the advantages associated with them, and fails to
recognize that disparities in wealth resulting from one transaction be-
come an advantage in the next. If we ask whether an individual
should be permitted to exploit his superior information or intelligence
in transactions with others, the answer-at least the answer the law
gives52-is "sometimes and under certain circumstances." In order to
explain why the possessor of these valuable resources should be allowed
to exploit them in some ways but not others, appeal must be made to a
principle of distributive justice. The same ought to be true if we ask
whether someone with a substantial bank account should be allowed
to take advantage of his superior wealth in transacting with other, less
wealthy individuals. In the first place, if we define a person's wealth
as comprising the sum total of revenue-generating assets which the law
permits him to exploit for his own benefit, his wealth will include
things like information, intelligence and physical strength, as well as
dollars in the bank. If we prohibit someone from exploiting poten-
tially valuable information or skills (for example, the skill of decep-
tion) we thereby decrease his wealth just as surely as if we were to take
some money from his bank account and burn it or transfer it into a
common fund. Second, it is wrong to think of money-wealth in the
narrow sense-as anything other than a transactional advantage, an ad-
vantage which gives its possessor a leg up in the exchange process.
Money enables an individual to acquire other transactional advantages
(for example, superior information), to withstand pressures that might
otherwise force him to make agreements on less favorable terms, to
outbid competitors, etc.; other things equal, the more money an in-
dividual has, the better he is likely to do in his transactions with other
persons. In fact, money not only gives its possessor a transactional ad-
vantage: unlike intelligence or physical strength, it gives him nothing
else. A sailor stranded alone on a desert island may benefit from his
52. Compare Pratt Land & Improvement Co. v. McClain, 135 Ala. 452, 456, 33 So. 185,
187 (1902) ("a purchaser [of real estate] though having superior judgment of values, does
not commit fraud merely by purchasing without disclosing his knowledge of value") with
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v. McElroy, 83 F. 631 (8th Cir. 1897)
(insurance contract set aside due to nondisclosure of operation for appendicitis during
period between signing of application and completion of contract).
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physical and mental abilities; unless he has someone to transact with,
however, the money in his pocket does him no good at all.
For these reasons, no one should be allowed to exploit his financial
resources in transactions with others to any greater extent than he
should be allowed to exploit his superior intelligence, strength or in-
formation. It is true that each of these represents wealth of a different
kind and gives its possessor a distinct advantage in transacting with
others. But it is unclear why any importance should be attached to
differences of this sort. If one kind of advantage-taking-that based on
superior information, for example-must be justified by showing that
it is consistent with a particular conception of distributive justice,
other kinds of advantage-taking, including those attributable to in-
equalities of a financial sort, should be justified in the same way. It is
simply arbitrary to assert that some forms of advantage-taking must be
justified but others need not be.
It does not follow, of course, that the rich should be forbidden to
exploit their financial power in transacting with the poor. Whether
and to what extent they should will depend upon the principle of dis-
tributive justice one adopts and factual details relevant to the principle's
application. There is, however, no a priori reason for regarding a rule
of contract law that is intended to reduce inequalities of wealth (in the
narrow sense) as any more objectionable than rules prohibiting fraud
or requiring the disclosure of certain kinds of information, which also
redistribute wealth (in the broad sense) from one group of individuals
to another. Although there may be a sound reason for opposing a rule of
contract law whose purpose is to shift resources from the rich to the
poor, 3 the reason cannot be that the special financial advantages en-
joyed by the rich fall outside the scope of the principle of distributive
justice that controls the assignment of rights to other kinds of transac-
tional advantages. Therefore, the only sensible interpretation of the
libertarian's position is the second or weak interpretation: when a
libertarian asserts that contract law should not be used to redistribute
wealth from the rich to the poor, he must be claiming either that exist-
ing inequalities of wealth are justified (for example, on utilitarian or
paretianist grounds) or that contract law is an unsuitable instrument
for correcting those inequalities which are unjustifiable. Stating the
libertarian position in this way, however, eliminates the most funda-
mental difference between liberal and libertarian theories of contract
law.
53. See Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L
REV. 1053, 1056-59 (1977).
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II. Taxation and Contractual Regulation
A. Two Methods of Redistribution
A liberal theory of society, as I am using the term here, is one that
approves forced redistributions of wealth, at least up to a point, as a
means of achieving a fair division of material resources among the
members of society. All theories of this sort are distinguishable from
libertarianism, which regards compulsory transfers aimed at achieving
distributive fairness as a kind of theft. For the purposes of this argu-
ment, a liberal theory of society may be defined as one that: 1) assumes
there is some characteristic or attribute of individuals in virtue of
which they may be said to deserve a share of society's wealth and pur-
ports to describe the pattern of holdings that would result if this
principle of desert were the sole or at least the primary basis for the
distribution of material resources; 2) treats this ideal pattern as an
evaluative standard by which to assess the fairness of the distribution
that actually obtains in any given society; and 3) assigns to the state
the task of bringing the existing distribution of wealth into conformity
with the ideal one.
5 4
There are, of course, many different theories that fit this general
description, some of which may be regarded as illiberal by the pro-
ponents of others. Disagreements of this sort reflect the fact that two
persons who both accept the legitimacy of forced redistribution may
nevertheless endorse different principles of desert and therefore dis-
agree as to which pattern of holdings would be an ideally just one. Such
disagreements are often quite sharp and I do not mean to minimize
their philosophical importance. In what follows, however, I shall ignore
these differences and continue to use the term "liberal theory" in the
broad sense defined above. There is significant agreement, among the
proponents of otherwise distinguishable conceptions of distributive
justice, regarding the appropriate method of achieving a fair division
of wealth in society and it is this point of agreement that I am espe-
cially interested in challenging here.5
It will be useful to begin by contrasting two different methods for
redistributing wealth. One method is taxation. To illustrate how taxa-
54. This characterization of liberal theories follows the account of "patterned" con-
ceptions of justice elaborated in R. NozicK, supra note 8, at 155-64.
55. The point of agreement is a preference for taxation as a method of redistributing
wealth. This preference is shared by liberal theorists whose principles of distributive justice
differ significantly in other respects. Compare Baic Structure, supra note 9, at 54-55
with J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 795-822, 966-69 (W. Ashley ed. 1923).
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tion works, assume that every individual in society is given his fair
share of society's resources, and then left free to transact with others on
whatever terms he wishes. The initial assignment of shares will neces-
sarily conform to a pattern of some sort, the pattern itself depending
upon one's theory of distributive justice. Over time, however, the over-
all pattern of individual holdings is bound to diverge from the original
and ideal one. As both critics and defenders of liberalism have pointed
out,56 this divergence is the unintended consequence of numerous
private transactions between different individuals, all attempting to
advance their self-interest in legitimate ways. However, when the result-
ing array of individual holdings is inconsistent with the principle of
desert underlying the original distribution of wealth, it must be modi-
fied by a corrective redistribution. If taxation is adopted as a method
of redistribution, those who now have more than they deserve will be
required to make an appropriate payment to the state, and the funds
collected in this fashion will be transferred to those whose holdings are
unjustly small. In this way, the original pattern of holdings can be
re-established, and distributive justice preserved.
A second method for achieving distributive justice involves a more
direct regulation of the terms on which individuals are allowed to
transact with one another. I shall call this method of redistribution
contractual regulation. To illustrate, suppose once again that everyone
is given his fair share of society's resources. This time, however, instead
of leaving people free to transact as they please and imposing a periodic
tax on their wealth, an attempt is made to preserve the fairness of the
original distribution of resources by restricting the terms on which
individuals are permitted to alter their holdings through voluntary
exchange-by forbidding certain transactions and, perhaps, by requir-
ing others. Minimum wage laws, for example, impose restrictions of
this sort: such laws attempt to insure a fair distribution of wealth be-
tween workers and employers by specifying, in part, the terms on which
workers may contract to sell their labor.
As between these two methods at redistribution-taxation and the
direct contractual regulation of individual transactions-many liberal
theorists appear to have a pronounced preference for the first. For ex-
ample, both in his book and in subsequent articles, John Rawls insists
on a distinction between what he terms the "basic structure" of society,
on the one hand, and "rules applying directly to individuals and as-
sociations and to be followed by them in particular transactions" on
56. See e.g., R. NozIcK, supra note 8, at 160-64; Basic Structure, supra note 9, at 64.
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the other.57 According to Rawls, the principles of distributive justice
must be considered in designing the institutions that comprise the basic
structure of society, including, in particular, the tax and transfer system.
The function of the basic structure, on Rawls's view, is to establish and
maintain a framework of entitlements that satisfies the principles of
distributive justice, within which individuals remain free to pursue
their own ends through voluntary transactions with others, "secure in
the knowledge," as he puts it, "that elsewhere in the social system the
necessary corrections to preserve background justice are being made."' ' 8
Rawls of course recognizes that there must be rules governing private
transactions between individuals, but he argues that these transactional
rules should be "framed to leave individuals . . free to act effectively
in pursuit of their ends and without excessive constraints." 50 In
Rawls's theory, rules of this sort are assigned only a facilitative role:
their proper function is to keep the exchange process running smoothly
by eliminating coercion and reducing the transaction costs associated
with the process itself.60 It is Rawls's view that rules governing private
exchange between individuals, unlike the tax laws, should not be
manipulated to help achieve a fair distribution of wealth among the
members of society. More strongly, it seems to be Rawls's view that the
law of contracts cannot be used in this way without illegitimately in-
fringing the right of individuals to pursue their own conception of the
good, free from excessive governmental interference. At several points,
Rawls speaks of a "division of labor" between "the basic structure [of
society] and the rules applying directly to particular transactions,"'6
1
the implication being that the distinctive distributive function of one
is no business of the other.
Rawls's preference for taxation as a method of preserving "back-
ground justice" and his reluctance to view the private law of contracts
as an equally appropriate vehicle for redistributing wealth reflect an
attitude shared by many liberal thinkers.6 2 Is it possible to justify this
preference for taxation and the non-distributive conception of contract
law that it entails?
One argument that is sometimes made by liberal theorists in support
of a non-distributive conception of contract law may be dismissed at
the outset. Suppose we have settled on a principle for evaluating the
57. Basic Structure, supra note 9, at 55.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 54-55.
61. See, e.g., id. at 66.
62. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 9, at 143-50; Grey, suPra note 9, at 890 n.38.
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fairness of different wealth distributions. The argument I have in mind
states that it would be wrong to assess particular transactions and to
resolve the disputes arising out of them by appealing directly to the
distributional principle we have chosen. 63 There is no reason to think
that judges or anyone else can correctly assess the distributional con-
sequences of particular transactions; more importantly, if every transac-
tion could be invalidated for its failure to conform to the principle in
question, individual expectations would be frustrated and voluntary
arrangements rendered insecure. Instead, the argument goes, transac-
tional disputes should be decided by applying the relevant rules of
law in a formalistic fashion, that is, without regard to the distributional
consequences of the decision itself, and the redistribution of wealth
should be left to the tax system instead.
This argument rests upon a confusion. Even if one agrees, for the
reasons indicated, that in particular cases judges and others charged
with responsibility for policing individual transactions should apply
established legal rules regardless of their distributional consequences,
it does not follow that distributional effects should also be ignored in
the initial design of a system of transactional rules or in the choice of
new rules to supplement or amend those that already exist. It is one
thing to evaluate individual transactions from a distributive perspec-
tive; it is another to evaluate the rules governing transactions from the
same point of view.04 Naturally, if one adopts the latter approach, there
may be individual cases in which the distributive purpose of a par-
ticular rule is frustrated rather than advanced by its application. But
this is the inevitable consequence of having a system of adjudication
based upon generally applicable norms rather than ad hoc determina-
tions, and does not provide a reason for ignoring distributive con-
siderations in the original choice or amendment of these transactional
norms themselves. If we ought to design rules of contract law without
regard to their distributive effect, it must be for some reason other than
the one I have just stated.
B. Redistribution, Neutrality and Individual Freedom
Two further arguments, based on moral considerations, may be
offered for preferring taxation to contractual regulation as a means of
redistributing wealth, and it is these I now want to consider. First, it
63. See J. RAwIs, sutra note 9, at 87-88; Basic Structure, supra note 9, at 54, 65.
64. Cf. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955) (reasons used to justify
choice of system of social rules may not properly be invoked to justify departures from
those rules once the system is established).
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can be argued that unlike taxation, contractual regulation discriminates
between different pursuits by prohibiting some forms of exchange but
not others, and is therefore inconsistent with the view, central to most
liberal theories, that the state should remain neutral between the aims
and activities of its citizens, so far as possible. Second, it can also be
argued that taxation leaves more room for individual freedom than
does a system of regulation that attempts to insure distributive justice
by manipulating the rules of private exchange.
These two claims lie at the heart of the liberal preference for taxa-
tion. What do they purport to establish? On the one hand, each claim
can be understood as asserting that taxation and regulation have in-
variant characteristics which necessarily make any tax scheme more
neutral and less intrusive than a system of regulatory control designed
to achieve the same end. If this were true, one would always be justified
in choosing taxation as a method for redistributing wealth. On the
other hand, these same two claims can be understood, in a more modest
fashion, as asserting only that circumstantial factors, which vary from
one situation to the next, often make taxation the better of the two
methods. If one adopts the latter view, any preference for taxation will
be contingent on contextual considerations which may (and I think do)
sometimes warrant the pursuit of distributional goals through a regula-
tory scheme instead. In my judgment, it is the latter view which is the
correct one: there is nothing about taxation that necessarily gives it
greater neutrality or makes it less restrictive of individual liberty than
contractual regulation, although in some cases a tax scheme may be
preferable for both reasons.
Consider, first, the question of neutrality: is taxation, by its nature,
a more neutral method of redistribution than contractual regulation?
Suppose that a fair distribution of wealth could most easily be achieved
by regulating or even prohibiting a particular class of transactions not
thought to be objectionable in their own right-for example, those in-
volving the sale of a few basic goods such as food and shelter. Even if it
were the least costly way of reaching our distributional goal, a regula-
tory regime of this sort might be rejected on the ground that it un-
fairly discriminates against one particular group of citizens-those who
would benefit, financially or otherwise, if the transactions in question
were left unregulated-by imposing the full burden of the distribu-
tive scheme on them alone. More generally, in evaluating alternative
methods for redistributing wealth, it is always necessary to consider
how broadly the burdens of redistribution are spread: if a particular
502
Vol. 89: 472, 1980
Contract Law and Distributive Justice
method imposes these costs only on some of those who ought to bear
them, this by itself counts against adopting the method in question.
This general consideration, however, applies to taxation and con-
tractual regulation alike, and does not warrant a universal preference
for the former method. Any workable scheme for redistributing wealth
is bound to discriminate unfairly in favor of some individuals or ac-
tivities. This is true even of the simplest income tax, which gives an
unjustified advantage to those who have more than they deserve but
are nevertheless able to accomplish their ends in ways that do not
produce taxable income. A selective income tax (such as the one we
actually have) that applies only to the income from certain types of
transactions or a sales tax on specific items designed to finance a system
of redistributive transfer payments are more obvious examples of dis-
criminatory taxes. But just as taxes vary in their neutrality, so do con-
tractual regulations: a law requiring bakers to sell their bread at *a
fixed price spreads the burdens of redistribution less widely than a law
requiring all employers to pay their workers a minimum wage. Neu-
trality is a property that each method of redistribution may possess to
varying degrees, and therefore even though we should always prefer
less discriminatory arrangements to more discriminatory ones, this does
not mean that we ought in every case to choose taxation as the appro-
priate means for redistributing wealth. In any particular instance,
whether taxation is the least discriminatory way of achieving a given
distributional end will depend upon the circumstances and the types
of taxation and contractual regulation that are being compared. The
relative neutrality of these two methods cannot be ascertained in ad-
vance since it is not a function of anything inherent in their nature.
Now consider the second moral argument for preferring taxation to
contractual regulation as a method of redistribution-that taxation is
less restrictive of individual liberty. To begin with, this may be under-
stood as a claim about the frequency of intervention required by these
alternative methods of redistribution. While taxation requires only a
periodic interference in the lives of individuals, the direct regulation
of transactions appears to necessitate continuous state involvement in
individual affairs. Since it is sensible to prefer less frequent intrusions
to more frequent ones, this might seem a good reason for preferring
taxation as a method of redistribution.
This argument is unconvincing, however. In the first place, some
taxes (sales taxes, for example) do apply continuously, to every in-
dividual transaction, and we do not think them objectionable for this
reason alone. The argument is plausible only if we think of every
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redistributive tax as being like a periodic tax on income. We are
tempted to do this, of course, because the income tax (unlike most
other taxes) has an explicit redistributive purpose. It would be a mis-
take, however, to think that non-income taxes cannot perform a similar
redistributive function: a special sales tax on luxury items might be an
example.
Second, even if a tax is only applied at periodic intervals, it repre-
sents a continuous interference in the lives of individuals in precisely
the sense suggested above. Suppose, for example, that the state imposes
a progressive income tax that must be paid annually and that treats
all income in the same way, regardless of its source. Throughout the
year, every income-generating transaction that an individual makes is
subject to the tax in question; the tax casts a shadow, as it were, over
the whole of his economic life. Just as a minimum wage law prevents
workers and employers from making certain kinds of contracts, an
annual income tax restricts the contractual freedom of those subject
to it. The existence of such a tax makes it impossible for anyone to
form a contract that does not have as- one of its implied terms a require-
ment that both parties share their income from the contract with the
state. In many transactions, this implied requirement is also likely to
affect other aspects of the parties' relationship, limiting their choice of
additional terms, and even dictating the very structure of the transac-
tion.6
5
All of this makes it wrong, in my view, to maintain that a periodic
tax on income is a less frequently intrusive method of redistribution
than the direct regulation of individual transactions. At this point, it
might be objected that an income tax is in any case less deeply intru-
sive even if the restrictions it imposes apply continuously. Taxation
appears to be less intrusive because it only takes money from people,
leaving them free to arrange their affairs in the way that best realizes
other, non-pecuniary ends. Regulation, by contrast, limits the sorts of
transactions individuals may arrange for themselves and thus seems
more restrictive of personal liberty.66 Thus, one might argue, while
regulation forbids people from doing certain sorts of things, a tax
scheme merely requires those subject to the tax to share with the state
the fruits of their voluntary transactions with other individuals.
This apparent difference in the restrictiveness of these two methods
65. For example, tax considerations are paramount in the planning of corporate
mergers, liquidations, and reorganizations.
66. Rawls implicitly endorses this view of regulation. See Basic Structure, supra note
9, at 65.
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of redistribution is illusory, however. In the first place, it is misleading
to say that contractual regulation forbids people from doing things but
a tax scheme does not. A tax on income, for example, forbids people to
keep what they have earned in income-producing transactions without
making an appropriate payment to the state. If an individual finds this
prohibition too restrictive, he can always shift his resources, including
his time and personal labor, to activities which do not produce income,
or which produce income and other goods-such as leisure-in differing
proportions. By the same token, if the law requires that a certain class
of agreements be made on terms specified by the state, individuals
making such agreements remain free to abandon them in favor of
other, unregulated transactions. In either case, of course, those subject
to the tax or regulatory limitation may remain free to avoid it only in
a theoretical sense: in an exchange economy, most of us must earn
income in order to survive, and an employer who wants to avoid the
impact of a law fixing the minimum compensation he must pay his
workers can do so only by going out of business. In my view, however,
this underscores the similarity-not the difference-of taxation and con-
tractual regulation as methods of redistribution, and casts doubt on
the claim that one is more restrictive of individual liberty than the
other.
The essential similarity of taxation and regulation is reflected in
another way as well. To the extent that it leaves individuals free in
other respects, a redistributive tax on income is unlikely to produce
the ideal pattern of holdings it is meant to achieve. If individuals are
able to shift the burden of the tax to others by arranging their transac-
tions with them in a particular way, and if they are free to substitute
non-taxable forms of wealth such as leisure for taxable income, the
redistributive goals of the tax may be frustrated, perhaps to a significant
degree. If so, to achieve a closer fit with the distributive ideal, it will
be necessary to supplement the tax with a set of rules which regulate
the content of individual transactions in greater detail. To achieve a
perfect fit, it may be necessary to expand the notion of taxable income
to include leisure itself, and once this has been done little difference
remains between mere taxation and a restrictive system of contractual
regulation. It is perfectly acceptable, of course, to stop short of this
point and opt for an income tax which leaves individual transactions
largely unregulated, but only if one is prepared to live with whatever
discrepancies exist between the resulting pattern of holdings and the
ideal one.
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The same is true, of course, if one chooses to pursue a given distribu-
tional goal by simply altering 'the terms on which individuals can
voluntarily exchange their property. Any incomplete regulation of a
contractual relationship, that is, any regulation which stops short of
imposing a compulsory contract on the parties, is unlikely to achieve
its redistributive purpose. So long as the parties to a contract remain
free to modify their arrangement in ways not already subject to govern-
mental control, the distributive consequences of regulating one aspect
of the contract can be partially frustrated or undone by altering its
other features. To illustrate the point, suppose that poor people are
frequently victimized by exorbitant interest rates (rates in excess of
those justified by the special risks of transacting with the poor). To
prevent exploitation of this sort, a law is passed forbidding merchants
to charge interest greater than some fixed amount. The first effect of
such a law may well be to diminish the supply of credit to the poor, or
to particular groups among the poor, thus making them worse rather
than better off. Even if the supply of credit is unchanged, merchants
may respond to the law by changing the terms on which they sell goods
to the poor-for example, by increasing price, eliminating warranties
or requiring additional security-and thereby prevent any change in
the status quo. If the regulation of interest rates is to have its intended
effect, these other aspects of the contractual relationship may also have
to be controlled by the state. In this way, partial regulation of the con-
tractual relationship creates its own pressure to expand the scope of
regulation, bringing the entire transaction more fully under the control
of the state.
Consequently, whether one adopts taxation or contractual regula-
tion as a method of redistribution, the incomplete control of individual
conduct, control which leaves individuals free in other respects, is cer-
tain to result in some divergence from the distribution of resources that
would be ideally just. In either case, any closer approximation to a
perfectly fair distribution of wealth will require more extensive limita-
tions on individual conduct and hence less freedom. Whichever method
we choose, if we value individual liberty, we are bound to reach a
point at which further restrictions on conduct cannot be justified by
the additional increment of distributive fairness that they yield. Every
theory of society that includes a desert-based principle of distributive
justice must face the unpleasant fact that to some extent liberty and
fairness inevitably conflict and must attempt to resolve the conflict
between them in a non-arbitrary manner.
This conflict does not, however, provide a reason for abandoning
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liberalism altogether since it is not a crushing objection to a theory of
society that it values two different things which conflict even across a
wide range of cases. More importantly, the inevitable conflict between
liberty and fairness does not justify a blanket preference for taxation
as a method of redistribution. A preference of this sort would be
warranted only if a greater degree of distributive justice could always
be achieved at a lesser cost in liberty by taxing the fruits of free ex-
change than by regulating the exchange process itself. The claim that
taxation has this universal advantage is an empirical claim and can
only be verified by a detailed, case-by-case comparison of these two
methods in different settings. In my view, an inquiry of this sort is more
likely to support the competing claim that contractual regulation is
sometimes a less-or at least a no less-restrictive way of achieving par-
ticular distributional goals. Usury laws, minimum wage laws, rent
control laws, and laws prohibiting racial discrimination in employment
and the sale of real property all have, as one of their objectives, a
redistribution of wealth in favor of traditionally disadvantaged groups.
Each of these laws attempts to achieve its goal by imposing restrictions
on the process of voluntary exchange. In each case, the same end could
be achieved through an appropriate combination of taxes and sub-
sidies. However, putting aside any question of the relative efficiency
of these different methods of redistribution, it seems to me unreason-
able to think that in every instance the restrictions on individual liberty
required to achieve a given level of distributive fairness through the
tax system will be less severe than the restrictions associated with its
regulatory counterpart. If we hold the distributional goal constant in
each case, and ignore all considerations of efficiency and administrative
cost, a blanket preference for taxation, based upon the belief that it
always leaves more room for individual freedom, is almost certainly
unjustified.
C. Efficiency and Administrative Cost
Of course, it might be the case that taxation is invariably a more
efficient and administratively simpler way of redistributing wealth,
and should therefore be preferred to contractual regulation on this
ground alone. This claim may be understood in two different ways.
First, someone making the claim may be asserting that contractual
regulation, unlike taxation, is almost always counterproductive in the
sense that it leaves its intended beneficiaries worse off than they would
otherwise be. This is an argument frequently made, for example, with
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regard to minimum wage and rent control laws. 67 If a landlord can
only charge his tenants some statutorily-fixed amount, the argument
goes, he will have an incentive to reduce maintenance and take his
property out of the rental market altogether, to the disadvantage of
renters or at least poor renters. This may be true but it does not show
the alleged superiority of taxation as a method of redistribution. If we
impose a tax on rental income and do not restrict the terms on which
landlords are allowed to rent, rents will rise accordingly, again to the
disadvantage of the poor.68
Naturally, it is irrational to adopt any redistributive scheme if it
leaves its intended beneficiaries worse off than they would otherwise
be. This is a general requirement, however, that applies to redistribu-
tive arrangements of all sorts. In my view, it does not support a blanket
preference for taxation. Even if contractual regulation often hurts those
it is meant to help, there is no reason to think that taxation is not
frequently counterproductive as well. This question is an empirical one
which must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, in the light of detailed
information about the circumstances likely to influence the effective-
ness of each method of redistribution.
The claim that taxation is more efficient than contractual regulation
can also be understood as a claim about their comparative administra-
tive costs. Even if taxation is on the whole equally restrictive of in-
dividual freedom, and has equally undesirable incentive effects, one
can argue that tax schemes are by their nature easier to administer and
therefore less costly than regulatory arrangements designed to achieve
the same end. But this argument, too, is unconvincing. Suppose, for
example, that a particular racial group has in the past been discrimi-
nated against in both the housing and employment markets, as a result
of which the group currently has an undeservedly small share of soci-
ety's wealth. One way of improving the group's material circumstances
is to impose restrictions on the exchange process in both markets by
67. See, e.g., .. HEILBRONER, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 521 (3d ed. 1972) (minimum
wage laws); R. POSNER, supra note 45, at 356-59 (housing codes imposing minimum
standards of habitability on slum dwellings); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique
of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J.
1175, 1186-93 (1973) (same); Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13
J. L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1970) (minimum wage laws).
68. Of course, if some other group is taxed in order to generate the funds with which
to subsidize low-income tenants, the behavior of landlords may be relatively unaffected.
By the same token, however, it may be possible to improve the welfare of low-income
renters by imposing contractual restrictions other than rent control, for example, a
minimum wage law. But either of these alternative arrangements may itself have un-
desirable incentive effects that work to the disadvantage of poor people generally and
hence to the disadvantage of poor renters.
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forbidding employers and those who sell or rent real property to dis-
criminate on the basis of race. Alternatively, one might attempt to
accomplish the same end without contractual regulation of any sort,
through an appropriate set of taxes and subsidies. For example, em-
ployers who hire members of the group might be rewarded by a reduc-
tion in their taxes, and group members might themselves be given
whatever additional funds they need to overcome the prejudice of
landlords and sellers and bid scarce housing resources away from non-
members. 9 In this case, however, reliance on the tax system as a means
of redistributing wealth is likely to entail much higher costs of admini-
stration than its regulatory counterpart. It is plausible to think that
at least up to a point, the group's material prospects can most easily
be improved by imposing a few simple restrictions on the contractual
rights of those whose past discrimination has created the present in-
equity.
More generally, contractual regulation always has at least one ad-
vantage over taxation from an administrative point of view. Under a
redistributive tax scheme, wealth must first be collected by the state
and then redistributed to the beneficiaries of the tax. Each of these
two steps has administrative costs. By contrast, if a redistributive restric-
tion on contractual freedom achieves its intended purpose, it causes a
direct transfer of wealth from one group to another without any
mediation by the state. Other things being equal, this means a reduc-
tion in administrative costs.
Of course, other things are not always equal. There are additional
administrative costs associated with any redistributive scheme, includ-
ing, in particular, the cost of enforcing it, and these costs will some-
times be sufficiently high under a regulatory arrangement to offset
whatever administrative advantage such an arrangement might have.70
It is unlikely that this will always be the case, however. Is there reason
to think, for example, that a minimum wage law will be more expensive
to enforce than a tax on income (designed to benefit the working poor)
which relies on self-reporting by individuals subject to the tax? In
either case, some of those burdened by the redistributive scheme will
69. For a discussion of individuals' "taste for discrimination," see G. BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d ed. 1971).
70. These include not only the direct costs of organizing, staffing, and maintaining a
regulatory agency, but also the drain on the economy that results from the forced diver-
sion of private sector resources away from their best economic uses. See, e.g., POSNER,
Taxation By Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT 5cr. 22 (1971) (regulation should
be considered branch of public finance); DeMuth, supra note 9, at 10-17 (discussing and
criticizing proposal that federal agencies should be forced to estimate costs of policies be-
fore implementing them).
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attempt to circumvent it by concealing the details of their transactions
with others, and in both cases, preventive measures must be adopted
which make concealment of this sort more difficult. There is, how-
ever, no a priori basis for believing that one scheme will be more
costly to police than the other, at least if the provisions contained in
both schemes are equally simple or complex. Considerations of ad-
ministrative cost may justify efforts to simplify any redistributive
method one adopts, but they do not warrant a blanket preference for
taxation. Here, too, circumstantial factors will be decisive-dictating
in some cases the choice of a tax system, in others the imposition of
restrictions on exchange, and in many a mix of the two. Like predic-
tions regarding incentive effects, considerations of administrative cost
almost certainly favor the use of different redistributive methods in
different situations.
Conclusion
If one believes it is morally acceptable for the state to forcibly
redistribute wealth from one group to another, the only question that
remains is how the redistribution should be accomplished. I have
described two methods of redistributing wealth, taxation and the
regulatory control of private transactions, and have argued that the
choice between them ought to be made on the basis of contextual con-
siderations that are likely to vary from one situation to the next.
Both methods may be more or less neutral in effect and both are
costly to administer. Each necessarily imposes limitations on individual
liberty and, on occasion, has incentive effects that make its adoption
irrational. These are considerations we must always keep in view in
choosing between the two methods, but they do not invariably dictate
the same choice: instead, they are likely to suggest that sometimes one
method, sometimes the other, most often, perhaps, a mix of the two,
is the best way of achieving whatever distributional goal we have set
for ourselves. I have attempted to show (admittedly, in a casual way)
that a blanket preference for taxation is unwarranted, and that con-
tractual regulation will on occasion be the least intrusive and most
efficient way of redistributing wealth to those who have a legitimate
claim to a larger share of society's resources. If I am right in thinking
this is so, distributive considerations should be permitted to influence
our choice of contract rules, as circumstances dictate, and should
not be flatly excluded from the domain of private exchange for what
are alleged to be principled reasons.
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I would like to conclude by returning briefly to the problem of
liberty and fairness. I have argued that distributive fairness can only
be achieved, by taxation or contractual regulation, at some sacrifice in
individual liberty. This claim reflects what I believe is the core of
truth in Nozick's assertion7 ' that the implementation of any patterned
conception of justice is bound to require interference in people's lives.
As I have suggested, however, the conflict between these values is not
itself a reason for abandoning liberalism and embracing libertarianism,
nor is it a reason for endorsing a non-distributive conception of con-
tract law. But the conflict does present any liberal theory with a cen-
tral and difficult challenge-the challenge of elaborating a reasoned
basis for reconciling the claims of liberty and fairness, without aban-
doning either. The measure of success achieved by a liberal theory of
society will depend, in large part, upon the extent to which it is able
to avoid arbitrariness at just this point.
71. R. NozieK, supra note 8, at 163.
The Yale Law Journal












































Secretaries to the Editors Edna I. Scott, Pamela Willmott
Student Contributors to This Issue
Robert A. Katzmann, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory:
Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy
Julie A. Roin, Creditors' Remedies As State Action
Douglas H. Rosenberg, Delegation and Regulatory Reform: Letting
the President Change the Rules
Vern R. Walker, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention of Right
